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Trade law in 1993 will be remembered primarily for the Uruguay
Round' and the North American Free Trade Agreement,2 not for
the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (Federal Circuit). With few exceptions, the Federal Circuit's
trade law decisions were limited in subject matter and precedential
value. Despite its broad jurisdiction over trade matters,3 the Federal
Circuit's published opinions dealt almost exclusively with the
Department of Commerce's (Commerce) administration of the
antidumping duty law.4 This Article summarizes the Federal Circuit
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The
Uruguay Round), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.LM. 81 [hereinafter Uruguay Round Agreement].
2. North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Government of
Canada and Government of the Central Mexican States (final draft Sept. 13, 1993), rprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 1 (1993).
3. The Federal Circuit's jurisdiction includes appeals of trade determinations by the
Department of Commerce, the International Trade Commission, and the Department of Labor.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1988). The Federal Circuit has directjurisdiction over appeals of § 337
intellectual property cases, id. § 1295(a) (6), and appellate jurisdiction over the Court of
International Trade (CIT) decisions regarding antidumping and countervailing duty cases,
customs decisions, and trade adjustment assistance, id. § 1295 (a) (5).
4. While several of the issues raised are equally applicable to countervailing duty cases, the
issues primarily arose in the context of antidumping investigations. The only exception is Belton
Industries v. United States, 6 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3491 (U.S.Jan.
25, 1994). Those issues applicable to both antidumping and countervailing duty investigations
are noted.
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opinions published in 1993 and highlights the anticipated effects of
the Uruguay Round Agreement on the Federal Circuit decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION TO ANTIDUMPING LAW
To understand the 1993 Federal Circuit cases, a brief outline of
antidumping duty law and the responsibilities of Commerce is
critical.5 U.S. law and the relevant international agreements provide
that the United States may impose additional duties on imports6 that:
(1) are sold at "less than fair value" (LTFV) (i.e., "dumped"), and (2)
cause or threaten to cause material injury to a domestic industry, or
materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry.'
LTFV sales are generally calculated as the difference between the
price of the foreign product in the United States and the price of the
same product in the country where it was manufactured.8 Determin-
In addition to the published decisions, there were several unpublished opinions. See, e.g., Chr.
Bjelland Seafoods A/S v. United States International Trade Commission, Nos. 93-1148, 93-1235,
(Fed. Cir. June 15, 1993); Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA. v. United States
International Trade Commission, Nos. 93-1337, 93-1350, (Fed. Cir May 26, 1993).
5. This brief summary includes only those provisions related to the 1993 Federal Circuit
decisions and is not intended to provide a complete description of antidumping duty law. For
example, it does not discuss suspension agreements or critical circumstances, issues that were
not before the court last year.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1)-(2) (1988). If the Department of Commerce and the International
Trade Commission (ITC) make the requisite affirmative findings, an antidumping duty will be
imposed on foreign merchandise. Id. This duty will be "in addition to any other duty imposed
and in an amount equal to the amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United
States price for the merchandise." Id. § 1673(2) (B); see also General Agreements on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art. VI [hereinafter GATT]. United States
law and the international agreements similarly provide for additional duties on subsidized
imports. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (providing authority to impose countervailing duties in amount
equal to net subsidy); GAIT, supra, art. VI.
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1)-(2) (1988). Commerce and the ITC administer the antidumping
laws in a bifurcated process. Commerce is responsible for determining the sufficiency of the
petition, whether there is dumping, the scope of any order, the amount of any dumping margin,
and annually reviewing the dumping margin. The ITC determines which products manufac-
tured in the United States are like the imported products, which U.S. companies should be
investigated as members of the domestic industry, and whether that industry is materially injured
or threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States is
materially retarded, by reason of the subject imports.
8. Id. § 1677b(a). This section provides:
(1) In General
The foreign market value of imported merchandise shall be the price, at the time
such merchandise is first sold within the United States by the person for whom (or for
whose account) the merchandise is imported to any other person ... with respect to
such [unrelated] person-
(A) at which such or similar merchandise is sold or, in the absence of sales, offcred
for sale in the principal markets of the country from which exported, in the usual
commercial quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for home consumption ....
Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 353.46 (1993) (explicating general rule that foreign market value will be
based on price in home market country).
Alternatively, LTFV is calculated as the difference between the U.S. price and the price in a
third country, or between the U.S. price and the constructed value of the merchandise. See 19
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ing LTFV sales involves three steps: (1) calculation of the U.S. market
price (USP); 9 (2) calculation of the foreign market value (FMV); 0
and (3) calculation of the difference between these two amounts."
This difference is the "dumping margin."12 To determine the USP
and the FMV, numerous technical adjustments are needed to arrive
at "ex-factory" prices, thereby making an "apples-to-apples" compari-
son possible."3
If Commerce determines, on the basis of the imports investigat-
ed,14 that the USP is less than the FMV, the importer must pay a
cash deposit or post a bond or other security in the amount of the
U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (1)(B) (1988) (calculatingLTFV based on price atwhich merchandise is sold
for exportation to third countries, when merchandise is not sold for home use or is sold in
comparatively small amounts); see also id. § 1677b(a) (2) (1988) (allowing use of constructed value
of imported merchandise when actual home market value cannot be ascertained); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.49 (1993) (explaining LTFV calculation when foreign market value relates to sales to third
country); id. § 353.50 (calculating constructed value based on costs of materials used for
merchandise); id. § 353.51(a) (2) (authorizing use of constructed value method if calculations
based on sales made at below-production costs are inadequate).
9. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a (providing methodology for ascertaining U.S. market price). This
section provides the following definitions:
(a) United States Price
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "United States price" means the purchase
price, or the exporter's sales price, of the merchandise, whichever is appropriate.
(b) Purchase Price
For purposes of this section, the term "purchase price" means the price at which
merchandise is purchased, or agreed to be purchased, prior to the date of importation,
from a reseller or the manufacturer or producer of the merchandise for exportation
to the United States. Appropriate adjustments for costs and expenses.., shall be
made if they are not reflected in the price paid by the person by whom, or for whose
account, the merchandise is imported.
(c) Exporter's Sales Price
For purposes of this section, the term "exporter's sales price" means the price at
which merchandise is sold or agreed to be sold in the United States, before or after
the time of importation, by or for the account of the exporter, as adjusted ....
Id. § 1677a(a)-(c); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.41 (indicating that actual or likely sales will generally be
used when calculating U.S. price).
10. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (providing methodology for ascertaining foreign market value).
11. Id. § 1673 (providing that antidumping duty imposed on foreign merchandise should
equal amount by which foreign value exceeds U.S. price).
12. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(f) (defining dumping margin as "amount by which the foreign
market value exceeds the United States price of the merchandise").
13. See MichaelJ. Coursey & David L. Binder, Hypothetical Calculations Under the United States
Antidumping Duty Law: Foreign Market Value, United States Price, and Weighted-Average Dumping
Margins, 4 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 537, 539 (1989) (arguing that adjustments allow
comparison between respective sales prices, "as if the customers of both sales had (1) taken
delivery at the factory gate and (2) paid cash for the goods at that time").
14. Commerce typically investigates all relevant imports entered during the month the
petition is filed, as well as the five preceding months. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION,
ANTIDUMPING MANUAL Ch. 6, at 6 (1992). In investigations involving a large number of sales,
however, Commerce tends to conduct the investigations based on sampling or averaging
techniques. 19 U.S.C. § 16.77f-1 (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.59 (1993).
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estimated dumping margin. 5 This amount reflects the difference
between the USP and the FMV."6 The actual duty is calculated and
paid after the first administrative review, a process commenced
approximately one year after the order is entered. 7  Once an
antidumping duty order is issued, it can be revoked if: (1) Commerce
investigates the imports and determines there is no dumping for a
period of three years; (2) no party requests an administrative review
for four years; or (3) Commerce or the International Trade Commis-
sion (ITC) determines that the order is no longer necessary because
of changed circumstances.'8
II. STANDING
Commerce generally initiates antidumping cases in response to a
petition 9 filed by an interested party on behalf of a U.S. industry.2
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d). This provision states: "If the preliminary determination of
[Commerce] is affirmative, [Commerce] ... (2) shall order the posting of a cash deposit, bond,
or other security, as it deems appropriate, for each entry of the merchandise concerned equal
to the estimated average amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States
price .... " Id.
16. Id. § 1673b(d)(2).
17. Id. § 1675(a). At the time of the administrative review, Commerce investigates every
entry and calculates the actual amount of dumping on each sale. Id. This calculation also
determines the estimated duties to be deposited until the next administrative review. Id.
(a) Periodic Review of Amount of Duty-
(1) In General.-At least once during each 12-month period beginning on the
anniversary of the date of publication of .. . an antidumping duty order . ..
[Commerce], if a request for such a review has been received and after publication of
such review in the Federal Register, shall-
(B) review, and determine (in accordance with paragraph (2)), the amount of any
antidumping duty...
and shall publish the results of such review, together with notice of any duty to be
assessed, estimated duty to be deposited.., in the Federal Register.
Id. In practice, Commerce often does not complete the administrative review within the
statutory time-period.
18. Id. § 1675(c). "[Commerce] may revoke, in whole or in part.. . an antidumping duty
order.., after review under this section.... Any such revocation ... shall apply with respect
to unliquidated entries of merchandise entered, orwithdrawn from warehouse, for consumption
on and after a date determined by [Commerce]." Id.; see also id. § 1675(b); 19 C.F.R. § 853.25
(1993).
19. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673(b) (1988) (describing procedures for petition-initiated
antidumping duty investigations). Alternatively, Commerce may self-initiate an investigation
"whenever [it] determines, from information available to it, that a formal investigation is
warranted into the question of whether the elements necessary for the imposition of a duty
under section 1673 of this title exist." Id. § 1673a(a) (1); see 19 C.F.R. § 353.11 (providing
antidumping duty procedures for investigations initiated by Secretary of Commerce).
Countervailing duty cases are similarly initiated. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (authorizing
Commerce to initiate countervailing duty investigations).
20. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b) (1). The statute requires that an antidumping proceeding be
initiated "whenever an interested party... files a petition with [Commerce], on behalf of an
industry, which alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the [antidumping] duty.
. and which is accompanied by information reasonably available to the petitioner supporting
those allegations." Id.; see id. § 1671a(b)(1) (providing corresponding requirements for
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Because the term "interested party"21 is clearly defined by statute,
there has been little litigation on the meaning of this term.2 The
term "on behalf of an industry," however, is not defined in the statute
and has generated substantial controversy and litigation.3
Commerce, the agency responsible for determining standing,24
assumes that the petition is filed on behalf of a domestic industry
unless a majority of domestic companies affirmatively opposes the
petition. 5 Only after opposition is expressed does Commerce
initiation of countervailing duty proceedings).
The Court of International Trade outlined the standing requirements as a two-step process
in Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l Trade 219, 226, 585 F. Supp. 670, 676 (1984),
holding that § 1673a(b) requires a showing (1) that petitioner is an "interested party" within the
meaning of the statute and (2) that a majority of that industry supports the petition. Id.
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9). The statute defines the relevant interested parties as:
(C) a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the United States of a like product,
(D) a certified union or recognized union or group of workers which is representative
of an industry engaged in the manufacture, production, or wholesale in the United
States of a like product,
(E) a trade or business association a majority ofwhose members manufacture, produce,
or wholesale a like product in the United States,
(F) an association, a majority of whose members is composed of interested parties
described in subparagraph (C), (D), or (E) with respect to a like product ....
Id. The Senate Committee on Finance approved the interested party provision "to provide an
opportunity for relief for an adversely affected industry and to prohibit petitions filed by persons
with no stake in the result of the investigation." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 63
(1979).
22. See Florex v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 28, 29-31, 705 F. Supp. 582, 585-87 (1989)
(deciding that wholesale flower trade association is interested party); Sandvik AB'v. United
States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 738, 741-45, 721 F. Supp. 1322, 1327-29 (1989) (ruling United Steel
Workers is interested party), affld mem., 904 F.2d 46 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
The interested party determination, while not often controversial, is critical. See, e.g., Belton
Indus. v. United States, 6 F.3d 756, 759, 761 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing CIT finding and
allowing Commerce to revoke apparel order on basis that companies requesting continuation
were not "interested parties"); see also discussion infra at notes 265-83 and accompanying text.
23. See Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, CA. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 666-67
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (analyzing Commerce's interpretation of tern "on behalf of an industry"). The
Federal Circuit noted that "it is not entirely clear whether Commerce construes 'on behalf of'
to be a standing requirement in the traditional sense, with a relaxed evidentiary showing, or
merely a characterization of the nature of the petition, the satisfaction of which is left to
Commerce's reasonable determination." Id.; see Trent Tube v. Avesta Sandvik Tube, 975 F.2d
807, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (agreeing with Suramerica decision that term "on behalf of all industry"
is subject to range of permissible interpretation).
24. See 19 C.F.RL § 353.13(a) (1994) (providing guidance for assessing sufficiency of
antidumping duty petition). Commerce assesses standing in the context of determining the
sufficiency of the petition and decides whether the petition properly alleges the elements
necessary for an antidumping duty, whether the allegations are supported by "information
reasonably available to the petitioner," and whether the petition is submitted by an interested
party. Id.; see also i&. § 355.13(a) (providing guidance for assessing sufficiency of countervailing
duty petition).
25. See Frozen Concentrated Orange Juice from Brazil, 52 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (Dep't
Comm. 1987) (final determination) ("[T]here is nothing in the statute, its legislative history, or
our regulations which requires that petitioners establish affirmatively that they have the support
of a majority of their industries."). Commerce recognized that in many cases, an affirmative
duty to show majority support"would be so onerous as to preclude access to import relief under
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws." Id.; se Certain Stainless Steel Hollow Products
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investigate the depth of the opposition.2' The burden of proof,
therefore, is in effect on the opposing companies to prove that they
represent more than fifty percent of U.S. production .2  Consequent-
ly, current litigation has focused on how Commerce determines
whether a majority exists.
from Sweden, 52 Fed. Reg. 5794,5803 (Dep't Comm. 1987) (final determination) (deciding that
opposition does not eliminate standing). Commerce insists that it may rely on petitioner's
representation to support its finding that standing exists "until it is affirmatively shown" that the
petitioner does not enjoy the majority support of its industry. Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish
from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 1010, 1011 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (aff. prelim. determination)
(excluding importers when deciding standing issue and finding no affirmative proof that
petitioner lacked standing); Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg.
10,041, 10,043 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final determination) (finding that opposition has not
affirmatively shown that petitioner does not have support of industry).
The courts have upheld Commerce's presumption. See, e.g., NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v.
United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 75, 78-79, 757 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (1991) (holding that
Commerce's presumption of majority support is reasonable and consistent with statute), affid
mem., 972 F.2d 1355 (1992), aftd, 997 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Citrosuco Paulista, S.A. v.
United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 1196, 1204-05, 704 F. Supp. 1075, 1084-85 (1988) (positing that
Commerce has considerable discretion and is not required to dismiss cases that are questionable
as to majority support).
26. See Stainless Steel Hollow Products from Sweden, 52 Fed. Reg. 37,810, 37,812 (Dep't
Comm.) (final determination), amended by 52 Fed. Reg. 45,985 (Dep't Comm. 1987) ("Where
domestic industry members opposing an investigation provide a clear indication that there are
grounds to doubt a petitioner's standing, [Commerce] will review whether the opposing parties
do, in fact, represent a major proportion of the domestic industry."). The Court of
International Trade has affirmed this practice. See NTN Bearing Corp. of Am., 15 Ct. Int'l Trade
at 78-79, 757 F. Supp. at 1429 (requiring Commerce to investigate proportion of industry
support for petition once opposition becomes apparent).
If those companies not opposing the petition comprise a "major proportion" of the relevant
industry, Commerce proceeds with the investigation. Ifthose affirmatively opposing the petition
constitute a majority, Commerce decides whether it will continue or terminate the investigation.
Again, the courts have affirmed Commerce's policy. See Comeau Seafoods Ltd. v. United States,
13 Ct. Int'l Trade 923, 927, 724 F. Supp. 1407, 1411 (1989) (finding it unnecessary for
petitioners to affirmatively establish majority support); Citrosuco Paulista, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade at
1205, 704 F. Supp. at 1084-85 (stating that Commerce may, but is not obligated to dismiss claims
unsupported by evidence that majority of domestic industry endorses petition); see also Kore, 13
Ct. Int'l Trade at 32, 705 F. Supp. at 588 (deeming it reasonable to accept petition as
representative of majority support if large fraction supported and no one opposed it).
27. See NTN Bearing Corp., 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 78-79, 757 F. Supp. at 1429 (requiring
Commerce to investigate proportion of industry support for petition); Stainless Steel Hollow
Products from Sweden, 52 Fed. Reg. at 37,812 (stating Commerce's policy of reviewing whether
opposition to investigation represents majority of domestic industry).
This percentage calculation raises two issues. In addition to the issue discussed in Minebea
Co. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1178, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993), regarding the source of information
for the numerator, the calculation raises questions regarding which companies are members of
the domestic industry and thus included in the denominator.
Even though the ITC is responsible for determining the domestic like product and domestic
industry, Commerce rules on these same issues in the context of its standing determination. See,
ag., Certain Fresh Atlantic Groundfish from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. at 1011; Low-Fuming Brazing
Copper Rod and Wire from South Africa, 50 Fed. Reg. 21,328, 21,329 (Dep't Comm. 1985)
(neg. prelim. determination) (explaining Commerce's inquiries into nature of one industry to
determine membership in domestic industry); cf Gilmore Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 Ct. Int'l
Trade 219, 227, 585 F. Supp. 670, 678 (remarking that ITC has exclusive authority to identify
and define "regional industry").
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In Minebea Co. v. United States,2" a foreign producer challenged
Commerce's calculation of majority support.2" Petitioner Torrington
filed a petition in the underlying petition that it claimed was on
behalf of the U.S. antifriction bearing industry, seeking the imposition
of antidumping duties on antifriction bearing imports from nine
countries."0 Consistent with its policy, Commerce issued question-
naires to several U.S. companies that opposed petitioner's standing."
In response to Commerce's questionnaire, Minebea's subsidiary, New
Hampshire Bail Bearings (NHBB), provided information on its own
production.32 It did not, however, provide the requested estimates
of its share of the U.S. industry.3 None of the other companies
responded. 4 Consequently, Commerce upheld petitioner's standing,
ruling that the companies challenging standing failed to establish that
a majority of the domestic industry opposed the petition.35
Importers and foreign producers from Japan and Germany,
including Minebea, challenged Commerce's standing determination
in three separate appeals to the Court of International Trade
(CIT). In each case, the party opposing standing failed to provide
the required market-share data in the underlying proceeding, and in
each case, the CIT upheld Commerce's standing determination. 37
Minebea appealed the CIT decision to the Federal Circuit, arguing
that Commerce did not have substantial evidence that petitioner had
majority support and that Commerce erred in not relying on the
ITC's market-share data."8 The Federal Circuit rejected Minebea's
substantial evidence argument. 9 Recognizing that petitioner is
28. 984 F.2d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
29. Minebea Co. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1178, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
30. Id. at 1179.
31. Id. at 1180. The questionnaires requested an estimate of the "'percentage share of the
U.S. market as it relates to the domestic production of antifriction bearings' and an estimate of
its 'percentage share of the U.S. market as it relates to the sale of antifriction bearings' for the
various classes and kinds of bearings subject to the antidumping investigation," including the




35. Antifriction Bearings (Other than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from
the Federal Republic of Germany, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,992, 19,005 (Dep't Comm. 1989) (final
determination).
36. See Minebea Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 20, 782 F. Supp. 117 (1992); NTN
Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 75, 757 F. Supp. 1425 (1991); SKF USA
v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 152, 762 F. Supp. 344 (1991).
37. See Minebea Co., 16 Ct. Int'l Trade at 20, 782 F. Supp. at 119-20; NTNBeaiing Corp., 15
Ct. Int'l Trade at 80-81, 757 F. Supp. at 1430-31; SKF USA, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 156, 762 F. Supp.
at 348.
38. Minebea Co. v. United States, 984 F.2d 1178,1180 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
39. Id. at 1181.
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presumed to have standing, the court focused on whether NHBB
provided sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption." The
court concluded that NHBB's failure to provide market-share data and
the other companies' failure to provide any data was substantial
evidence to support Commerce's finding of standing.
41
The court further rejected Minebea's argument that Commerce
should be required to use the ITC's market-share data.42 Although
the ITC had gathered market-share data for its injury finding, the
court refused to require Commerce to use this data.43 The court
held that Commerce "may determine what information it should use
in order to carry out its statutory duty" regarding standing.4 The
court further noted that even if Commerce would have reached a
different result using the ITC data, this would not invalidate
Commerce's standing determination.' The court found that the
only question was whether Commerce's decision was supported by
substantial evidence. 6 Finding that it was, the court affirmed
Commerce's decision.
7
Dissatisfied with the U.S. presumption of standing, U.S. trading
partners pressed for, and obtained, significant changes in the Uruguay
Round agreements.4 The Antidumping Agreement provides that:
An investigation shall not be initiated ... unless the authorities
have determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of
support for, or opposition to, the application expressed by domestic
producers of the like product, that the application has been made
by or on behalf of the domestic industry. The application shall be
considered to have been made "by or on behalf of the domestic
industry" if it is supported by those domestic producers whose
collective output constitutes more than 50 per cent of the total
production of the like product produced by that portion of the
domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the
petition. However, no investigation shall be initiated when





44. Id. at 1182.
45. See ia (stating that "[t]he possibility of drawing different and inconsistent conclusions




48. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 1.
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for less than 25 per cent of total production of the like product
produced by the domestic industry.
49
Thus, under the new Antidumping Agreement, there must be an
affirmative showing that at least twenty-five percent of the domestic
industry supports the petition. Only if this threshold is met, is
Commerce allowed to presume that the petition is supported by fifty
percent of that industry. Opponents of the petition would still have
the opportunity to demonstrate that they account for at least fifty
percent of the industry. Consequently, Commerce's current practice
of presuming support, affirmed in Minebea, is expected to be
overturned as a result of the new Antidumping Agreement and the
U.S. legislation implementing that agreement." Moreover, the
proposed legislation excludes related parties from the calculation of
support,5' and the factual scenario presented in Minebea probably
will not arise in the future.
III. BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE
To obtain information for its dumping calculations, Commerce
issues questionnaires to respondent companies requesting specific sale
transaction data.52 If respondents are unwilling or unable to provide
the requested data, Commerce applies the "best information
49. Uruguay Round Agreement, supra note 1, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
[hereinafter Antidumping Agreement], art. 5.4; see id., Agreement on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Measures, part V, art. 11.4 (providing parallel countervailing duty provision).
50. At the time this Article went to press the U.S. legislation implementing the Uruguay
Round had not been enacted. The Clinton Administration had proposed changes to U.S. law,
congressional hearings had been held, and the House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee had suggested modifications to the Administra-
tion proposals. SeeAdministration's Proposals on Antidumping Agreement and Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, June 20, 1994 [hereinafter Administration Proposal];
Gibbons - Matsui En Bloc Amendment,June 20, 1994, [hereinafter House Proposal]; United
States Senate Committee on Finance Chairman's Proposal, July 19, 1994 [hereinafter Senate
Proposal]; and Committee on Finance Consideration of Legislation Implementing the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Staff Recommendation on Amendments,July 27,1994
[hereinafter Senate Amendments] (proposals and amendments on file with authors). The
official bill will not be presented to Congress until sometime in the Fail, and hence it was not
possible to confirm the final provisions at the time this Article went to press.
Legislation implementing the Uruguay Round is being handled under "fast track" procedures.
Fast track procedures differ significantly from normal legislation in that the legislation originates
from the Administration, and Congress must approve or reject the entire bill without
amendment. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194, 2902-2903 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) The fast track
procedures are not a statutory requirement but have been adopted as an exercise of the
rulemaking power of the House of Representatives and the Senate. See id. § 2191(a) (1). To
ensure that Congress will approve the final bill, the Administration currently is consulting closely
with Congress and "mock" congressional hearings and a conference are being held.
51. Administration Proposal, supra note 50, at 39; House Proposal, supra note 50, at 16;
Senate Proposal, supra note 50, at 48.
52. 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(b) (1994).
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available" (BIA) rule.53 The BIA rule is "an investigative tool, which
[the] agency may wield as an informal club over recalcitrant par-
ties."54 Its purpose is to provide the data necessary for Commerce's
calculations within the strict statutory deadlines, either by inducing
cooperation or by providing alternative sources of data for the
calculation.5
The courts have interpreted the BIA rule to allow Commerce to
reject incomplete or improperly formatted submissions," even if the
response substantially complies with Commerce's data request."7
Moreover, the courts have held that it is within Commerce's discre-
tion to determine which data is "best."" Commerce has the authori-
53. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c) (1988). This statutory rule provides: "In making their
determinations under this subtitle, [Commerce] and the Commission shall, whenever a party
or any other person refuses or is unable to produce information requested in a timely manner
and in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an investigation, use the best
information otherwise available." Id. A second BIA provision refers to unverifiable information,
and provides that "[i]f [Commerce] is unable to verify the accuracy of the information
submitted, it shall use the best information available to it as the basis for its action, which may
include ... the information submitted in support of the petition." Id. § 1677e(b).
54. Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see U.H.F.C.
Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 119, 129-30, 706 F. Supp. 914, 922 (1989) (finding that
ITA's use of information was proper), aJJ'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 916 F.2d 689 (Fed.
Cir.), vacated and remanded, 14 Ct. Int'l Trade 753 (1990), dismissed, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 433
(1991).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1979) (explaining that purpose of rule
is to facilitate timely completion of proceedings within deadlines). The BIA provisions were
enacted in 1979 as one of the administrative reforms to shorten the timeframe of antidumping
investigations. Id. Congress believed that delay in the assessment and collection of data was
responsible, in part, for the previously lengthy process. Id.; see Tai Yang Metal Indus. v. United
States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 345, 350, 712 F. Supp. 973, 977 (1989) (confirming Commerce's
authority to use best information available "to facilitate timely completion of administrative
proceedings").
56. See Rhone Poulenc, Inc. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 218, 224, 710 F. Supp. 341,
346 (1989) (upholding Commerce's rejection of submission because information was not
provided in sufficient detail or in requested computer format), afj'd, 899 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir.
1990); Uddeholm Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 969,971-72, 676 F. Supp. 1234, 1237-
38 (1987) (sustaining Commerce's use of best information available because of inability to attain
data in proper requested form).
57. See, e.g., Olympic Adhesives v. United States, 899 F.2d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(justifying use of best information available to prevent respondent from controlling investigation
by selectively providing data); Rhone Poulenc, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade at 224, 710 F. Supp. at 346
(commenting that substantiality test could effectively permit respondents to determine outcome
of administrative proceeding by strategically withholding ind revealing requested information);
Pistachio Group of Ass'n of F ood Indus. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 668, 679, 671 F.
Supp. 31, 40 (1987) (interpreting best information rule as means of precluding respondents
from controlling investigation by providing partial information).
58. See, e.g., Neuweg Fertigung GmbH v. United State, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 724, 725, 797 F.
Supp. 1020, 1024 (1992) (indicating that Commerce is granted broad discretion in deciding
which information to use and is only required to provide reasonable explanation of its decision);
N.A.R., S.pA v. United States, 14 Ct. Int'l Trade 409, 414, 741 F. Supp. 936, 942 (1990)
(suggesting that courts will not question whether Commerce has chosen "best" information, and
will respect Commerce's decision if it is supported by substantial evidende); Chemical Prods.
Corp. v. United States, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 626, 633, 645 F. Supp. 289, 295 (1986) (approving
Commerce's use of discretion to decide what constitutes IA after respondent fails to provide
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ty to replace the actual figures with different numbers even if the
substitute data is not accurate 9 or appears punitive.' Particularly
in instances where respondents do not cooperate, the courts have
approved margin calculations based on the highest numbers
possible.6 1  These calculations usually reflect those alleged by
petitioners,62 or in the alternative, the highest margin found for any
company in the investigation. 63 The courts have interpreted BIA as
the "common sense inference that the highest prior margin is the
most probative evidence of current margins because, if it were not so,
the importer, knowing of the rule, would have produced current
information showing the margin to be less."'
In the administrative procedure underlying Allied-Signal Aerospace Co.
v. United States,65 Commerce modified its prior BIA approach by
adopting a two-tiered methodology.66 The first tier would be applied
to companies that refuse to cooperate or otherwise significantly
requested information), remand order vacated, 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 819, 651 F. Supp. 1449 (1986).
59. Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade
13, 28, 704 F. Supp. 1114, 1126 (1989) (remarking that best information available is not synony-
mous with most accurate information available and that BIA merely serves as surrogate for
information respondent has failed to supply), affd, 901 F.2d 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Uddeholm
Corp., 11 Ct. Int'l Trade at 971, 676 F. Supp. at 1236 (permitting Commerce to replace
information provided by party with less accurate data, "if it is the best information otherwise
available"); Pistachio Group, 11 Ct. Int'l Trade at 679, 671 F. Supp. at 40 (allowing Commerce to
use unverified data if it is best information otherwise available).
60. Rhone Poulenc; 899 F.2d at 1190. The Federal Circuit found that BIA would not be
punitive unless the agency rejected a low margin in favor of a higher margin that was
demonstrably less probative of current conditions. Id. The court interpreted Commerce's use
of BIA as a presumption that induces importers to comply with questionnaires. Id. Because the
presumption is rebuttable, it "implements the basic purpose of the statute-determining current
margins as accurately as possible." Id. at 1190-91.
61. SeeAllied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(upholding Commerce's use of highest calculation as BIA).
62. 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(b) (1993). Commerce's regulations provide that "[t]he best
information available may include the factual information submitted in support of the petition
or subsequently submitted by interested parties." Id.
63. See Cyanuric Acid from Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 2741, 2742 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final
admin. review). In Cyanuric Acid, Commerce explained its use of "highest margin found" data
as follows:
When a company refuses to provide the information requested in a timely manner, or
otherwise significantly impedes [Commerce's] review, [Commerce] assigns to that
company the highest margin for the subject merchandise of: (1) The highest margin
calculated for that company in any previous review, (2) the highest margin calculatedfor
any respondent that supplied adequate responses in this review;, or, (3) the margin for that
company calculated in the less than fair value (LTFV) investigation.
Id. (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit has upheld Commerce's use of the highest rate
calculated in the current review for any firm or the firm's own prior rate as BIA. Allied-Signa4
996 F.2d at 1190.
64. Rhone Poulenc, 899 F.2d at 1190.
65. 996 F.2d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
66. Allied-Signa4 996 F.2d at 1188 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 31,705 (1991)).
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impede the investigation.' This would result in the selection of the
most adverse margin possible.' The second tier would be applied
to companies that substantially cooperate but are unable to provide
the information in a timely manner or in the form requested. 9 This
would result in a less punitive margin.7" The second-tier approach
is substantively similar to Commerce's previous policy that had been
validated by the Federal Circuit.7"
In Allied-Signal, appellant argued that this new two-tiered BIA
methodology was "impermissibly punitive, frustrating the remedial
purposes of the law."72 The Federal Circuit was not persuaded by
this argument and found that the two-tiered methodology would
induce essential cooperation and that it was appropriate to consider
the degree of a particular respondent's cooperation, as well as the
adequacy of the response. 73
The Federal Circuit, however, did find that the first tier could not
be properly applied to Allied-Signal.74 Allied-Signal's exporter had
67. Id.
68. Id.; see Antifriction Bearings (other than Tapered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof
from the Federal Republic of Germany, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,692,31,705 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final
admin. review). Commerce would be permitted to select the highest margin of any company
as the best information available. Commerce offered this explanation of its first-tier policy
When a company refused to cooperate with [Commerce] or otherwise significantly
impeded these proceedings, we have used as BIA the higher of (1) the highest of the
rates found for any firm for the same class or kind of merchandise in the same country
of origin in the less than fair value investigation (LTFV) or (2) the highest rate found
in this review for the same class or kind of merchandise in the same country of origin.
Allied Signa 996 F.2d at 1188.
69. Allied Signa/ 996 F.2d at 1190.
70. See id at 1188. Commerce would be permitted to select only the higher of a company's
own prior margin or the highest rate calculated in the current proceeding. Id. at 1190.
Commerce explained:
When a company substantially cooperated with our requests for information including,
in some cases, verification, but failed to provide the information requested in a timely
manner or in the form required, we have used as BIA the higher of: (1) the firm's
LTFV rate for the subject merchandise (or the "all others" rate from the LTFV
investigation, if the firm was not individually investigated), or (2) the highest calculated
rate in this review for the class or kind of merchandise from the same country of
origin.
Id.
71. Id. at 1191 (explaining that Commerce's new policy is consistent with statutory purpose
underlying BIA rules, which is to facilitate determination of dumping margins as accurately as
possible within tight statutory deadlines); see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text
(discussing courts' interpretation of BIA rule).
72. Allied-Signal, 996 F.2d at 1189.
73. Id. at 1191-92.
74. Id. at 1191. Allied-Signal asserted that, given its willingness to cooperate, use of the first-
tier margin against it -tas "inordinately harsh and punitive." Id at 1187. Commerce countered
that its decision to use the higher rate was reasonable because Allied-Signal "offered no evidence
indicating that recent margins were more probative of current market conditions'than the other
companies' dumping rates from the original investigation." Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v.
United States, 802 F. Supp. 463, 464 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).,
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attempted to comply with the law and offered to supply the informa-
tion requested by Commerce in an alternative form.' The Federal
Circuit held that because Allied-Signal's exporter made an effort to
supply information, the case should be analyzed under the second-tier
methodology. 6 The court specifically found that application of the
first tier would neither induce Allied-Signal to comply nor encourage
other companies to comply in the future.77 Furthermore, the court
found that Commerce's refusal to accept the simplified reporting
method suggested by respondent resulted in its not using the best
information, as the statute requires.
78
In future cases, the Antidumping Agreement will modify U.S.
application of the BIA rule significantly.79 U.S. legislation imple-
menting that agreement is expected to alter: (1) Commerce's
authority to reject respondent's entire submission as long as some of
the data is usable,80 and (2) Commerce's responsibility to confirm
the BIA information chosen.81 The Antidumping Agreement and
the implementing legislation, however, are not expected to overturn
the basic two-tiered approach upheld by the court in Allied-SignaL
82
75. Allied-Signal, 996 F.2d at 1192. Allied-Signal's exporter, SNFA, notified Commerce that
because of its costing system and limited accounting resources it would not be able to provide
the data as Commerce requested. Id. Instead, SNFA sought a simplified process and
corresponded with Commerce regarding a possible accommodation to SNFA that would meet
Commerce's needs. Id.
76. Id. at 1193. "However, in view of the undisputed fact that SNFA supplied as much of
the requested information as it could and offered to provide the remaining information in a
simplified form, we must conclude that it was unreasonable for [Commerce] to have
characterized SNFA's behavior as a refusal to cooperate." Id. at 1192.
77. Id. at 1192-93.
78. Id. at 1193.
79. SeeAntidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 6 and Annex II.
80. The Administration and Senate Proposals would require Commerce to consider such
information if (1) it is submitted by the deadline; (2) it can be verified as required by U.S. law-
(3) it is not so incomplete that it cannot serve as a reliable basis; (4) the party acted to the best
of its ability;, and (5) the information can be used without undue difficulty. Administration
Proposal, supra note 50, at 54; Senate Proposal, supra note 50, at 52. The House Proposal would
require Commerce also to take into account the "computer capabilities" of the submitting party
when determining if that party has acted to the best of its ability. House Proposal, supra note
50, at 22.
81. The Administration Proposal would require Commerce to corroborate information if
it makes an adverse inference. Administration Proposal, supra note 50, at 54. In such cases, it
is to use independent sources "reasonably at [Commerce's] disposal" "to the extent practicable."
Id. at 54. The House Proposal would require that Commerce corroborate all secondary source
information, not just that used in making adverse inferences. House Proposal, supra note 50,
at 22.
82. The Antidumping Agreement specifically states that "[i]f an interested party does not
cooperate, it could lead to a result which is less favorable to the party than if it did cooperate."
Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, Annex II.
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IV. EXISTENCE OF A "SALE" IN THE UNITED STATES
The current U.S. antidumping statute requires Commerce to
determine whether the merchandise under investigation "is being, or
is likely to be, sold in the United States" at less than fair market
value.83 The statute does not clearly define the term "sold" and,
consequently, there has been considerable litigation on this provision.
In particular, the statute does not address whether components that
are incorporated into a finished product before sale fall within the
definition of "sold."84
Under past decisions of the Federal Circuit, components are within
the definition of "sold" if they have no purpose other than to be
assembled into the finished product and if the finished product is
subject to the antidumping duty order.' The Federal Circuit has
found that to hold otherwise, even if there is significant value added
to the component in the United States before sale, would allow
imports "to escape the purview of the [antidumping] order."8 6
In NTN Bearing Corp. of America v. United States, 7 the Federal
Circuit, consistent with prior case law, held that imported bearing
components were effectively being "sold" in the United States, thereby
meeting the statutory requirement.'m The court further found that
Commerce did not abuse its discretion by not calculating a separate
margin for components. Commerce had conducted an extremely
complex investigation to determine whether imports of antifriction
bearings were being dumped into the United States.89 In order to
ease the burden on respondents, Commerce decided that it was too
onerous to require importers of bearing components to calculate a
constructed price at importation by backing out the value added to
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1988).
84. Id.
85. Samsung Elecs. Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1427, 1428-29 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (per
curiam).
86. Gold Star Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 707, 692 F. Supp. 1382 (1988), afid,
Samsung Elecs. Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In Gold Star, Commerce
imposed an antidumping order on color television receivers from Korea. Id. at 1383. A Korean
producer challenged Commerce's subsequent determination that components imported into the
United States for assembly into color television receivers were within the scope of the
antidumping order. Id. The CIT affirmed Commerce's scope ruling, reasoning that applying
the antidumping duties to components subsequently assembled into the product subject to the
order was necessary to prevent circumvention of the order. Id. at 1385.
87. 997 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
88. NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
89. Antifriction Bearings (Other than Papered Roller Bearings) and Parts Thereof from
Japan, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,101, 19,101-03 (Dep't Comm. 1989) (final determination); see NTN
Bearing Corp., 997 F.2d at 1454-56 (providing detailed summary of administrative proceedings
before Commerce).
[Vol. 43:1521
TRADE DECISIONS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND
the components during the U.S. production process.90 Instead,
Commerce imposed the same antidumping duty on the components
as it calculated for the bearings imported into the United States, a
rate it calculated by taking a sample of the prices of imported bear-
ings.9
1
NTN Bearing Corp. of America, American NTN Bearing Manufac-
turing Corp., and NTN Toyo Bearing Co. (collectively NTN) appealed
to the CIT. 2 The CIT did not address the question of whether the
components were sold in the United States but instead focused on
whether NTN's components were properly within the scope of
Commerce's investigation.93 The CIT held that the components
were within the scope of the investigation.94
In its appeal to the Federal Circuit, NTN argued that the CIT
misunderstood its challenge to Commerce's decision.95 NTN agreed
that the components were within the scope of Commerce's investiga-
tion, but argued that Commerce had no authority to calculate a
dumping margin on components that were not sold to an unrelated
party in the United States.96 Because the components did not
constitute merchandise that "is being, or is likely to be, sold in the
United States at less than its fair value" under 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1),
NTN argued that the components were not covered by the statute.
97
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's decision.9 The court
90. Ant ffriaion Bearings, supra note 89, at 19,103.
91. Id. at 19,101-03.
92. NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 719, 720, 802 F. Supp.
448, 451 (1992), af'd, 997 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1453, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1458. The Federal Circuit also considered whether Commerce was justified in
subjecting components to the duty rate calculated for bearings because Commerce's sample of
imported bearings had not included any samples of component prices. Id. The court
recognized Commerce's authority to select appropriate samples and averages to determine
dumping margins, but raised the question of whether Commerce's approach had met the
statute's requirement that such samples be "'representative of the transactions under
investigation.'" Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(1) (b) (1988)).
The court concluded that Commerce had not abused its discretion in this case. NTNBearing
Corp., 997 F.2d at 1458. In reaching this decision, however, the court relied heavily on the fact
that NTN supported at the administrative level Commerce's decision to apply the bearings rate
to components and that this decision was taken in part for the benefit of respondents such as
NTN. Id. Indeed, the court appeared to view the question as one of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, stating that NTN could not "mount [a valid legal challenge to
Commerce's sales sampling decision] at this time." Id.
The Federal Circuit also briefly addressed NTN's request that the case be remanded to
Commerce to consider whether the value added to bearing components was so substantial that
the components should be considered as outside the scope of the investigations. The court
rejected NTN's request, holding that "in an antidurmping inestgatioh ... the burden falls on
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stated that its decision in Samsung Electronics Co. v. United State?'9 was
controlling on the question of whether a dumping margin could be
calculated on components that were not sold to an unrelated party in
the United States."0 The Federal Circuit interpreted the Samsung
precedent,0 ' as holding that
an antidumping order may, as a matter of statutory authority, reach
imported components which are not sold in the United States as
components but instead are sold as part of a product assembled in
the United States, in circumstances where the imported compo-
nents have no purpose other than to be assembled into an end
product that would have been within the scope of the order had it
been imported in an assembled form.10 2
Central to the Federal Circuit's rationale in NTN Bearing was the fact
that NTN conceded that its components were dedicated solely for use
in manufacturing completed bearings sold in the United States.0 '
Because NTN's components inevitably would be sold in the United
States as incorporated into completed bearings, the Federal Circuit
concluded that "including these components within the scope of an
antidumping order does not constitute an evasion by the ITA of the
sold or likely to be sold requirement of § 1673(1). "1°
The Antidumping Agreement neither deals with the "sold" issue
directly nor with the underlying circumvention concern.105 U.S.
implementing legislation, however, is expected to modify the current
U.S. anticircumvention provision.10 In addition to the require-
ments interpreted by the court in NTNBearing, the Senate and House
amendments would focus on whether the process of assembly or
completion in the United States is minor or insignificant and the
value of the parts or components is a significant portion of the total
the importer to demonstrate that its imported products should be excluded from the scope of
an antidumping investigation." Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.31, 353.37 (1992)). Because NTN
had not submitted any evidence of the value added to the components, the court held that NTN
could not raise this issue on appeal, particularly because NTN could still request a prospective
scope ruling from Commerce. Id. at 1459.
99. 873 F.2d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
100. N7N Bearing Corp., 997 F.2d at 1457. The court specifically found that Samsung
Electronics "as a matter of precedent, bound [them] to the same answer in this appeal."
101. In Samsung, the Federal Circuit had affirmed the CIT's judgment and adopted its
opinion in Gold Star Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 707, 692 F. Supp. 1382 (1988).
102. rTN Bearing Corp., 997 F.2d at 1457.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Uruguay Round negotiators were unable to agree on specific text regarding
anticircumvention, and the issue was referred to the Commission on Antidumping Practices for
later resolution. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 18.
106. House Proposal, supra note 50, at 25; Senate Amendments, supra note 50, at 8.
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value of the merchandise. 07  Thus, if these proposals are enacted
as expected, any future court would be interpreting a significantly
different statutory provision from that analyzed by the court in NTN
Bearing.
V. CALCULATION OF FMV AND USP
Commerce determines antidumping duties by calculating the excess
of the foreign market value (FMV) of the subject merchandise by its
U.S. price (USP).108 To ensure an accurate calculation, Commerce
must make an "apples-to-apples" comparison to ensure that the prices
it is comparing are indeed comparable.'0 9 The appropriate compar-
ison point is called the ex-factory price. Commerce determines the
foreign ex-factory price by adjusting the FMV by: (1) discounts and
rebates directly related to the subject sales;' (2) certain circum-
stances of sale;' (3) differences related to quantities;" 2 (4) differ-
107. Senate Proposal, supra note 50, at 66-67; Senate Amendments, supra note 50, at 8; see
House Proposal, supra note 50, at 25.
108. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text (discussing statutory bases and methodolo-
gies used to determine FMV, USP, and antidumping margins and duties). For discussions of the
policies underlying the adjustment methodology for FMV and USP, see generally GREYSON
BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICES (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STUDY OF ANTIDUMPING ADJUSTMENTS METHODOLOGY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY
CHANGE (1985) [hereinafter STUDY OF ANTIDUMPING ADJUSTMENTS]; Charlene Barshefsky &
Richard 0. Cunningham, The Prosecution ofAntidumping Actions Under the Trade Agreements Act of
1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 307 (1981). The definition of "foreign market value" is
contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (1988); the definition of "United States price" is contained in
19 U.S.C. § 1677a.
109. See Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984) ("One of the goals of the statute is to guarantee that the
administering authority makes the fair value comparison on a fair basis-comparing apples with
apples.").
110. The statute does not contain express authority to adjust FMV for rebates and discounts,
but Commerce has generally relied on 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(1) (A) and 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (4) (B).
See, e.g., Color Picture Tubes from Japan, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,186, 44,187-88 (1987) (final
determination); Television Receiving Sets, Monochrome and Color, from Japan, 50 Fed. Reg.
24,278, 24,281 (1985) (final results); ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, supra note 14, Ch. 8, at 15 ("We
generally deduct discounts actually granted by a manufacturer to its home market or third
country customers from the sales price in order to determine the net return on the sale.
Common types of discounts are quantity discounts, early payment discounts and loyalty
discounts. A discount is in effect a reduction in the price for the merchandise.").
111. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (4) (B); 19 C.F.R. § 353.56 (1994). Commerce generally
deducts from FMV direct selling expenses and offsets for commissions and offsets for indirect
selling expenses that are deducted from ESP. The most frequent deductions are expenses
related to credit costs, advertising and sales promotion, technical services, warehousing,
warranties and guarantees, and certain commissions. ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, supra note 14, Ch.
8, at 16.
112. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (4) (A); 19 C.F.R. § 353.55; Brass Sheet and Strip from the
Netherlands, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,431 (1988) (final determination). To be eligible for a quantity-
based adjustment, a respondent generally must demonstrate a direct link between the price
differences and the quantities sold. Brass Sheet and Strip from the Netherlands, supra.
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ences in merchandise;113 (5) the level of trade;" 4 and (6) differ-
ences in packing costs." 5 To reach the comparable U.S. ex-factory
price, Commerce adjusts the USP by: (1) expenses incident to
bringing the merchandise from the place of shipment in the foreign
country to the place of delivery in the United States; 6 (2) certain
export taxes;" 7  (3) packing costs;"" (4) duty drawback;" 9  (5)
certain countervailing duties;' 20 and (6) taxes that are charged on
113. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (4) (C); 19 C.F.R § 353.57. Under these provisions, Commerce
will adjust FMV for differences in the physical characteristics of the products being compared.
Where similar, but not identical, products are being compared, Commerce will make a
"difference in merchandise adjustment" to FMV to account for the physical differences between
the products. See, e.g., Antifriction Bearings from Various Countries, 54 Fed. Reg. 19,070 (1989).
114. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (4) (B); 19 C.FR. § 353.58. Under these provisions, Commerce
will compare U.S. sales to home market sales that are at the same level of trade, to the extent
possible. Examples of different levels of trade include end users or original-equipment
manufacturers, wholesalers or distributors, and retailers.
115. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1) (B); 19 C.F.R. § 353.46(a); see also ANTIDUMPINO MANUAL,
supra note 14, Ch. 8, at 12 (stating that "[a]djustments made for the difference in packing costs
(incurred in the home country) between the home market sale and the U.S. sale are made on
the home market price.... We deduct the packing cost for home market sales from and add
the packing cost for export to the United States to the home market price."); STUDY OF
ANTIDUMPING ADJUSTMENTS, supra note 108, at 16, 19,25; Personal Word Processors fromJapan,
56 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,298-99 (1991) (prelim. determination).
116. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (2) (A); 19 CF.RL § 353.41(d) (iv) (2) (i). Commerce refers to
these deductions as "movement charges." They include U.S. import duties; U.S. inland freight
and insurance; U.S. brokerage, handling and port charges; international freight; foreign' inland
freight and insurance; and foreign brokerage, handling and port charges. ANTIDUMPING
MANUAl, supra note 14, Ch. 7, at 5; Anti~friaion Bearings, supra note 35, at 19,048-49.
For Exporter's Sales Price (ESP) sales, Commerce also will deduct commissions paid to
unrelated agents for selling the merchandise in the United States; expenses generally incurred
on behalf of the exporter in the United States in selling the merchandise under investigation;
and any value added to the merchandise after importation but before its sale to the first
unrelated customer in the United States. Id.; see also LMI-LaMetalli Industriale, S.p.A. v. United
States, 912 F.2d 455 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming determination of Commerce that sales of brass
sheet and strip from Italy were at less than fair value); High Information Content Flat Panel
Displays and Display Glass Thereof from Japan, 56 Fed. Reg. 32,376 (1991) (final determina-
tion); Certain Small Business Telephone Systems and Subassemblies Thereof from Korea, 54
Fed. Reg. 53,141 (1989) (final determination).
117. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (2)(B); 19 C.F.R. § 353.41(d) (iv)(2) (ii).
118. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1) (A) (requiring that USP be increased by "the cost of all
containers and coverings and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the
merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States."); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.41 (d) (1) (i).
119. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1) (B) (requiring that USP be increased by "the amount of any
import duties imposed by the country of exportation which have been rebated, or which have
not been collected, by reason of the exportation of the merchandise to the United States"); 19
C.F.R. § 353.41(d) (1) (ii). For an application of Commerce's duty drawback methodology, see
Brass Sheet and Strip from Japan, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,298 (1988) (final determination).
120. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1) (D) (requiring that USP be increased by "the amount of any
countervailing duty imposed on the merchandise.., to offset an export subsidy"); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.41 (d) (1) (iv). This provision reflects a presumption that export subsidies lower the USP
by the amount of the subsidy. In contrast, Commerce makes no adjustment for countervailing
duties imposed to offset a domestic subsidy. In addition, Commerce makes no adjustment to
USP for deposits of estimated antidumping duties. See PQ Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int'l
Trade 53, 67, 652 F. Supp. 724, 737 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987) (explaining intent behind require-
ment ofdepositing estimated dumping diities as means of deterring dumping while not "unduly"
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home market sales but are rebated or not collected on export
sales.' 2 '
The courts have granted broad deference to Commerce's interpre-
tation of the definitions and adjustments required for these calcula-
tions. In fact, Commerce is afforded particular deference to its
expertise in making these complex adjustments to the FMV and the
USp. 122
A. Tax Adjustments
Commerce has the authority to make tax adjustments for the USP
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) . 2  This provision requires the
USP to be increased by:
the amount of any taxes imposed in the country of exportation
directly upon the exported merchandise or components thereof,
which have been rebated, or which have not been collected, by
reason of the exportation of the merchandise to the United States,
but only to the extent that such taxes are added to or included in
the price of such or similar merchandise when sold in the country
of exportation. 2 4
The Federal Circuit has recently decided two cases concerning
Commerce's interpretation of this provision. In Zenith Electronics Corp.
v. United States,"2 the Federal Circuit held that the only permissible
adjustment for taxes is to increase the USp.126 In Daewoo Electronics
Co. v. International Union of Electronic Workers,1 27 the court held that
the phrase "to the extent" should not be interpreted to require Com-
merce to determine the tax incidence in the home market.
1 28
burdening importers who are attempting to eliminate dumping).
121. See infra notes 123-90 and accompanying text.
122. For example, in Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
the Federal Circuit upheld Commerce's use of the circumstances-of-sale provision, reasoning that
Congress had not expressly addressed this adjustment to FMV, making deference appropriate.
Id. at 1576-77. Similarly, in Consumer Prods. Div., SCM Corp. v. Silver Reed Am., 753 F.2d 1033
(Fed. Cir. 1985), the Federal Circuit affirmed commerce's limitation of the adjustment of FMV
for indirect home market selling expenses to the amount of such expenses incurred in the U.S.
market. The court stressed that Commerce is the "master" of the antidumping law and that
limiting the deduction from FMV of indirect selling expenses to the amount deducted from USP
for indirect selling expenses was not "irrational." Id. at 1039-40.
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(b) (1988).
124. Id. § 1677a(d) (1) (C).
125. 988 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
126. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
127. 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denai/, 62 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S. June 13, 1994) (No.
93-1328).
128. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1511, 1516-17 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
62 U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S.June 13, 1994) (No. 93-1328).
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In the case underlying Zenith Electronics, Commerce attempted to
apply a circumstances-of-sale adjustment to FMV in addition to the
statutorily required increase to the USP.1 Commerce applied this
second adjustment to offset the anomaly of the "multiplier effect," a
phenomenon that artificially increases the dumping margin."' The
"multiplier effect" occurs when the foreign tax is an ad valorem tax,
that is, it is calculated as a percentage of the FMV, rather than a per-
unit tax.' 31 While the percentage adjustment would be the same in
both the United States and the foreign market, e.g., fifteen percent,
it would be applied to different absolute numbers. Specifically, the
commodity tax would be applied to the larger home market price (or
FMV), while Commerce's adjustment would be applied to the smaller
USP.132
The Federal Circuit, affirming the CIT, reversed Commerce's
attempt to correct the anomaly and prohibited the use of the
circumstances-of-sale provision for this purpose.'33 The Federal
Circuit emphasized that Congress had provided expressly in §
1677a(d) (1) (C) that rebated home-market taxes should be addressed
by adjusting the USP. 34 The court reasoned that because Congress
had expressly provided for tax adjustments to the USP, but had not
so provided for adjustments to the FMV, Commerce may account for
129. Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1578. The circumstances-of-sale provision states:
In determining foreign market value, if it is established to the satisfaction of
[Commerce] that the amount of any difference between the United States price and
the foreign market value (or that the fact that the United States price is the same as
the foreign market value) is wholly or partly due to . . . (B) other differences in
circumstances of sale... then due allowance shall be made therefor.
19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a) (4) (1988).
130. Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1578.
131. See id. (stating that by virtue of use of ad vakom tax, when dumping margin exists,
adjusting USP under § 1677a(d) (1) (c) will increase dumping margin leading to multiplier
effect).
132. For example, if the pre-tax FMVofa hypothetical Japanese television model is $100 and
the USP for the same model is $90, the absolute dumping margin for the television is $10 ($100-
$90). Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1578 (citing Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1382,
1386 n.9 (CL Int'l Trade 1986)). If the tax is 15%, the tax on the FMVis $15 and the after-tax
FMV is $115. The amount of the tax added to the USP, however, would only be 15% of $90 or
$13.50. Id. Adding $13.50 to the USP adjusts the USP to $103.50 and increases the absolute
dumping margin to $11.50 ($115-$103.50). Id.; seeJohn D. McInerney, Treatment of Border Tax
Rebates of Consumption Taxes Under the Antidumping Law, 10 Nw.J. INT'L L & Bus. 213 (1989)
(analyzing the CIT's opinion in Zenith and discussing treatment of export rebates of
consumption taxes).
The percentage issue would only arise when FMV exceeded USP and, thus, a dumping margin
already existed. If no dumping margin exists, however, there is no risk of a multiplier effect.
Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1581. The Federal Circuit noted that no company would be found to be
dumping solely because of the multiplier effect. Id. at 1581-82.
133. Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1582.
134. Id.
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home-market taxes only by adjusting the USP 5 According to the
court, the legislative history further supported this approach. The
House-Senate Conference Committee rejected the House of
Representatives' provision that defined the FMV to exclude sales taxes
levied in the home market, and thus, permit an adjustment to the
FMV.36 Instead, the Conference Committee decided to include
these taxes in the FMV and adjust the USP.13 7
Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that the general circumstances-
of-sale provision did not contradict this interpretation of Congress'
intent." First, the court noted that allowing Commerce to use the
circumstances-of-sale provision to adjust either the USP or the FMV
for home-market taxes would render superfluous the statutory
provision authorizing Commerce to adjust only the USP.1 9 Second,
the court emphasized that the purpose of the circumstances-of-sale
provision did not apply in this case."4 The distortion in the dump-
ing margin was not caused by different circumstances of sale in the
home market and the U.S. market, but rather, by the operation of the
antidumping statute. 4' Finally, the court found that the legislative
history of the circumstances-of-sale provision did not indicate that
Congress intended Commerce to use this provision to make home-
market-tax adjustmentsH2
In Daewoo Electronics Co. v. International Union of Electronic Work-
ers, 143 the Federal Circuit again ruled on the tax adjustment provi-
sion, this time analyzing the last phrase.'4 This phrase provides
that the USP is to be increased only "to the extent that such taxes are
added to or included in the price of such or similar merchandise
when sold in the country of exportation."" The court considered
whether this provision for adjusting the USP for taxes rebated on
exports to the United States required Commerce to engage in an
economic analysis to determine the extent to which certain Korean
135. Id. at 1580.
136. 61 CONG. REc. 254 (1921) (stating that "'foreign home value' wherever used in this title
•. shall not include any excise tax levied against such merchandise").





142. Id.; seeS. REP. No. 1619,85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1958); H.R. RFP. No. 1261,85th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7 (1957) (listing only variations in sale and credit terms, and advertising and selling
costs, as warranting circumstances-of-sale adjustment under statute).
143. 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
144. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1515-16 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.LW. 3822 (U.S.June 13, 1994) (No. 93-1328).
145. 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1) (C) (1988).
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manufacturers were passing on such taxes to their home-market
consumers. 146
Commerce interpreted this statutory provision as requiring
Commerce to add to the USP the full amount of certain Korean taxes
on merchandise, which were forgiven upon export to the United
States. 147 These taxes were assessed on sales in the Korean market,
and it was undisputed that the Korean companies had paid the
taxes.148  Commerce concluded that it was required, under the
statute, to adjust the USP upward by the full amount of these forgiven
taxes. 49 In effect, Commerce assumed that the taxes imposed on
the Korean companies in the home market were fully passed through
to Korean purchasers.
In Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States (Daewoo 1), the CIT
rejected Commerce's interpretation of the statute." Relying on its
prior decision in Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States,5' the court
held that the statute required Commerce to analyze the extent to
which the taxes imposed on Korean companies were in fact passed
through to Korean purchasers.- 3 The court described Commerce's
decision as "rewriting the express requirements of the Statute."154
The court remanded the case to Commerce with instructions to
determine the economic incidence of the taxes imposed on Korean
companies in the home market." Thus, Daewoo I held that the
U.S. statute required Commerce to make an economic analysis of the
extent to which the taxes were passed through to Korean purchas-
ers.
156
On remand from Daewoo , Commerce hired an expert to do an
econometric measurement of the incidence of the Korean taxes.
157
Based on certain assumptions as to the nature of the Korean
146. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1515.
147. Id. at 1514.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 253, 712 F. Supp. 931 (1989).
151. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade 253, 282, 712 F. Supp. 931, 956
(1989) (Daewoo 1), affd in part and rex'd in par, 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62
U.S.L.W. 3822 (U.S.June 13, 1994) (No. 93-1328).
152. 10 Ct. Int'l Trade 268, 633 F. Supp. 1382 (1986).
153. Daewoo I, 13 Ct. Int'l Trade at 281, 712 F. Supp. at 955.
154. Id., 712 F. Supp. at 956.
155. Id. Seegenerally PAULA. SAMUELSON &WILLuAM D. NoRDHAus, ECONOMICS 387-89 (12th
ed. 1985) (applying supply and demand analysis to determine tax incidence).
156. But see Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 813 F. Supp. 856, 862 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1993) (declining to follow reasoning in Daewoo and sustaining Commerce's view that statute did
not require pass-through analysis).
157. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1515 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
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television receiver market, the study found that the tax incidence in
the Korean market was 100%.158 Thus, Commerce determined that
the purchaser bore the entire amount of the Korean taxes imposed
on the Korean companies. 59
In Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States (Daewoo 1),160 the CIT
rejected Commerce's remand determination.16 ' The court found
that the proper estimation, or elasticity, of the demand curve was of
central importance to the result because the demand curve would
determine the estimated incidence of the tax.1 62 The court rejected
Commerce's economic analysis of the demand curve because it was
based on theoretical grounds without sufficient connection to
substantial evidence in the record. Thus, while Daewoo I held that
the statute required Commerce to engage in economic analysis,1
64
Daewoo !fheld that in conducting economic analysis, Commerce must
base its analysis on substantial evidence in the record rather than
relying entirely on theory."6
On remand from Daewoo I, Commerce considered econometric
studies submitted by both respondents and petitioners.166  Com-
merce rejected the study submitted by respondents and relied on
petitioners' study as the best information available. 67 Commerce
then found tax incidence ranging from thirty-three percent to sixty-
three percent.168 This reduced pass-through of the tax meant that
less of the tax was added to the USP, and therefore the dumping
margin was increased. 69  In Daewoo Electronics Co. v. United States
(Daewoo Ifl),17' the CIT affirmed Commerce's decision171
When the case reached the Federal Circuit as Daewoo Electronics Co.
v. International Union of Electronic Workers,'72 the Federal Circuit
reversed the CIT's decision in Daewoo I that had required Commerce
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 124, 760 F. Supp. 200 (1991).




164. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing Daewoo 1).
165. Daewoo II, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 131, 760 F. Supp. at 206.




169. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 583,584-85,794 F. Supp. 389,390
(1992) (Daewoo Ill).
170. Id. at 583, 794 F. Supp. at 389.
171. Id. at 393.
172. 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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to perform an economic analysis of the incidence of the Korean
taxes. 73 The Federal Circuit treated the issue as one of statutory
interpretation."7 4 The court quoted language from the Supreme
Court decisions in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.75 and Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States 76 to express
the proposition that "considerable weight" and "great deference"
should be given to an agency's interpretation of the statute it
administers.'77 The court stated that "[t]hese tenets extend to their
limits when [Commerce] interprets the antidumping laws." 78
Applying this deferential standard of review to Commerce's
statutory interpretation, the Federal Circuit held that Commerce's
interpretation of § 1677a(d) (1) (C) was reasonable.1 79 The court
found that the statute did not expressly require an analysis of tax
incidence.' The court also found that the legislative history was
sparse and ambiguous, 8' that subsequent legislation amending the
antidumping law had failed to modify Commerce's consistent practice
of not conducting tax incidence analysis, 8 ' and that the CIT's
interpretation of the statute would have imposed an "onerous burden"
on Commerce while producing "results of dubious soundness,"
delaying investigations, and eliminating the predictability of
antidumping duty assessments."'
Because of its disposition of Daewoo I, the Federal Circuit did not
address the CIT's holding in Daewoo 17 that Commerce had applied a
tax-incidence analysis with an insufficient link to the evidence of
record.'84 Indeed, to the extent the Federal Circuit addressed the
issue raised by Daewoo HTof the need for economic theory to be based
on substantial evidence, it agreed with the concerns expressed in
Daewoo ff." The court noted the difficulties inherent in perform-
ing an econometric analysis of tax pass-through due to the uncertainty
173. Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1519 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
174. Id. at 1516.
175. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
176. 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
177. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1516.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1517.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1518.
182. Id. (stating that Congress amended antidumping law in 1984 and 1988 without
addressing Commerce's interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1) (C)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1513. The court explicitly noted that its "disposition of the tax incidence issue
moots . .. the Korean Companies' appeal from the holding of Daewoo II... rejecting
Commerce's finding of full pass-through in the Korean receiver market." Id. (citation omitted).
185. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text (discussing decision in Daewoo I1).
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involved in choosing one model over another, precisely the rationale
underlying Daewoo if."86
Daewoo raised the additional issue of which USP should be used for
the tax adjustment. 1 7  Commerce used the net delivered selling
price to the first unrelated customer as the USP to be adjusted,
reasoning that this would have been the price on which the Korean
tax was imposed.'88 In Daewoo f, the CIT rejected Commerce's
decision and held that the Korean statute would have imposed the tax
on the ex-factory price, so that Commerce should have used the ex-
factory price as the USP to be adjusted. 89 The Federal Circuit
disagreed, finding that because the Korean legislation was ambiguous
and that the actual Korean tax practice was to impose the tax on the
net delivered selling price rather than the ex-factory price,
Commerce's determination was reasonable.19°
B. Principal Market
In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States,'9' the Federal Circuit also
affirmed the CIT's findings regarding three other issues. First, two
Japanese producers appealed Commerce's determination that all of
their home-market sales were "principal market" sales under §
1677b(a) (1) (A) and should be considered in calculating the FMV.'92
The Federal Circuit held that Commerce had reasonably interpreted
the statutory provision, and that Commerce was entitled to presume
that all the home-market sales were "principal market" sales. 9 ' If
the producers possessed any contrary information, they should have
presented such information to Commerce in order for it to be
considered.'94 The court stated that "[t]he burden of production
should belong to the party in possession of the necessary informa-
tion."19 5
C. Warranty Expenses
Second, two Japanese producers challenged Commerce's denial of
circumstances-of-sale (COS) adjustments for home-market warranty
186. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1518.
187. Id. at 1519.
188. Daewoo II, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 125, 760 F. Supp. at 202.
189. Id. at 127, 760 F. Supp. at 204.
190. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1519-20.
191. 988 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
192. Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 988 F.2d 1573, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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expenses. 96 Commerce required the producers to prove that their
related-service companies made a profit on warranty services. 197 The
Federal Circuit affirmed the approach employed by Commerce.9 8
The court found that § 1677b (a) (4) (B) gave Commerce the authority
to requirejustifications for COS adjustments, and that Commerce had
a consistent practice of requiring evidence establishing that payment
to related companies was at competitive rates.199
D. Level of Trade Adjustment
Third, a Japanese producer challenged Commerce's denial of a
"level of trade" adjustment for the difference between wholesale and
retail market prices."0 The Federal Circuit upheld Commerce's
requirement that a producer present evidence establishing that it had
not manipulated its transactions with its related sales company in
order to obtain this adjustment. 01
The Antidumping Agreement is expected to modify the
antidumping calculations in several ways, 20 2 most significantly to
implement the "fair comparison" requirement. The Antidumping
Agreement requires that "due allowance shall be made in each case,
on its merits for differences which affect price comparability,
including differences in conditions and terms of sale, taxation, [and]
levels of trade."20 3 Despite these changes, many of the proposed
amendments would codify current Commerce regulations or are not
at the level of detail relevant to the 1993 Federal Circuit cases that
addressed the anti-dumping calculations. It therefore is unclear to
what extent, if at all, the specific findings in the cases discussed above
will be disturbed.
VI. COST OF PRODUCTION
If Commerce determines that a foreign producer is selling below




199. Id. at 1583-84.
200. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.58 (1993) (stating that when sales at same commercial level are
insufficient in number, FMV will be calculated based on sales at most comparable level and
adjustments made for resulting price differences).
201. Zenith, 988 F.2d at 1584.
202. For example, the agreement (1) requires that price comparisons be made between
weighted average normal values and export prices or between individual normal values and
export prices; and (2) modifies the calculation of exchange rates. Antidumping Agreement,
supra note 49, art. 2.
203. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 2.4.
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as the difference between COP and the USP, rather than the differ-
ence between the USP and the FMV. The statute provides that:
Whenever the administering authority has reasonable grounds to
believe or suspect that sales in the home market of the country of
exportation, or, as appropriate, to countries other than the United
States, have been made at prices which represent less than the cost
of producing the merchandise in question, it shall determine
whether, in fact, such sales were made at less than the cost of
producing the merchandise.2
The CIT has interpreted the "reasonable grounds" standard as a
"particularized and objective basis for suspecting . . . [sales below
cost] . . . taking into account the totality of the circumstances." °5
While this standard is less than the "probable cause needed for a
search warrant,"20 6  it still requires "specificity in the informa-
tion."207
In FMC Corp. v. United States,208 the Federal Circuit explained that
"overly generalized and ambiguous statements, outdated information,
and mere speculation" do not meet the "reasonable grounds"
standard of review. 2' The court held that Commerce had applied
the correct standard when it denied a request by FCM Corp. (FCM)
that Commerce investigate sales below the COP. 210 The Federal
Circuit also found that FMC's evidence did not meet this standard
204. 19 U.S.C. § 167lb(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
205. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 245, 246-47, 575 F.
Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (1983) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 916 (1983)), affid on other grounds, 745 F.2d 632 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
206. Connors Steel Co. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 242, 248-49,527 F. Supp. 350, 357
(1981).
207. Al Tech, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade at 248-49, 575 F. Supp. at 1280 (citing United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)).
208. 3 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
209. FMC Corp. v. United States, 3 F.3d 424, 428 (Fed. Cir. 1993). The cost of production
issue arose in FMC Corp. in the context of a preliminary injunction. Id. at 426-27. Interested
parties frequently seek preliminary injunctions from the CIT in antidumping or countervailing
duty cases to enjoin Commerce from instructing the Customs Service to liquidate entries
pending the interested party's appeal to the CIT. Liquidation of an entry means that the duty
rate paid on that entry has been finally determined by the United States, so that interested
parties can no longer argue for a higher or lower rate.
210. Id. at 428. The court reached this conclusion even though Commerce had imposed an
additional requirement that FMC prove "actual sales" below cost, and the court agreed that the
language in Commerce's decision seemed to imply two standards. Id. at 428 n.7. The court
noted, however, that "FMC is not required under the statute to prove actual sales below the
COP. That is ajob for Commerce. To require otherwise would go against the grain of common
sense because if FMC can prove actual sales at below [the exporters'] COP, then a COP
investigation would not be necessary." Id. The court appeared to reason that because FMC had
not established the reasonable grounds required for a COP investigation in any case,
Commerce's imposition of an additional requirement for initiating a COP investigation was
harmless error. See id.
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and that Commerce correctly rejected it.21' The court stated that
FMC's evidence was "speculative at best and failed to satisfy the
statutory language requiring specific and objective evidence." 212
The court noted that a consultant's three-year-old report was outdated
by current data and that the consultant failed to index properly the
costs for inflation.21 3 Further, the court found that a 1990 financial
statement that FMC relied on as indicating losses by the exporter
included numerous products not at issue, and that a 1989 financial
statement, which was equally relevant, reflected profits by the
exporter.214
Finally, the court found that Commerce had not violated procedur-
al due process by limiting FMC's time for submitting information
regarding its cost of production. 21 '5  The court noted that
Commerce's regulation allows flexibility to determine the time that it
allows for COP allegations. 216
While the Antidumping Agreement does not modify the triggering
mechanism for a COP investigation, the U.S. implementing legislation
is expected to define the term "reasonable grounds" more precisely.
The Administration and Senate Proposals define "reasonable grounds
to believe or suspect" as "factual information" based on "observed or
estimated prices."217  The House Proposal defines the term as
"observed or constructed prices."21 '  Thus, the standard in future
cases is expected to be higher than the ambiguous requirement
interpreted by the court in FMC that there be "specificity in the
211. Id. at 429.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 428.
214. Id. at 428-29.
215. Id. at 429. Because Commerce was late in sending out the administrative review
questionnaire to the exporter, and the exporter was late in responding, FMC had only 31 days
to prepare its COP allegation. Id. FMC argued that it should have had 60 days. Id. The court
stated that "[i]t is unclear to this court how FMC's due process rights were violated." Id.
216. Id. (citing 19 C.F.R. § 353.31(c) (1994)). The court also addressed whether FMC had
shown it would be irreparably harmed if the injunction were not granted. See id. at 429-31.
Finding that the CIT had erred in holding that FMC would not be irreparably harmed, the court
stated that under Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, the liquidation of entries subject to an
administrative review pending appeal constitutes irreparable harm. Id. at 430-31 (citing Zenith
Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
The court held, however, that the mere existence of irreparable harm to FMC was insufficient
to override the fact that FMC was not likely to succeed on the merits. Id. at 430. The court
stressed that "FMC's failure to submit any other evidence to establish the extent of that harm
now proves fiatal to its appeal." Id. The Federal Circuit stated that "[t]he failure to prove
likelihood of success on the merits presents a formidable obstacle to the granting of an
injunction." Id. at 431. The court did not address the remaining preliminary injunction issues,
"balance of hardships" and "public interest," because these issues were not in the CIT opinion
on appeal. Id.
217. Administration Proposal, supra note 50, at 4-5; Senate Proposal, supra note 50, at 38.
218. House Proposal, supra note 50, at 3.
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information." Moreover, the Antidumping Agreement significantly
modifies the calculation of sales at less than the cost of production,
and the U.S. implementing legislation is expected to change the
relevant evidence before the courts in future casesY19
VII. CAPPING OF BONDS
Once Commerce determines that there is dumping, either in its
preliminary or final determination, importers must pay provisional
duties on all entries.220 These provisional duties, in the amount of
the estimated dumping margin, are collected during the interim
period between the finding of dumping and the entry of the or-
der.2 ' The provisional duties may be in the form of "a cash depos-
it, bond or other security."222  If the estimated duties are in the
form of a cash deposit, the statute provides that the liability is capped
at the amount of the cash deposiL22 Commerce regulations
extended this cap to bonds. 24
In 1991, the CIT overturned Commerce's regulation regarding
bonds. In Zenith Electronics Corp. v. United States,225 the court held
that because the statute distinguished between cash deposits and
bonds, Commerce had no authority to provide a cap for bonds.226
219. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 2.2. In the implementing legislation, the
Administration proposes to modify the cost of production calculation, including the allocation
of costs, the start-up costs, the profit and loss calculations, and the general selling and
administrative expenses. Administration Proposal, supra note 50, 7-11; see also House Proposal,
supra note 50, at 4-6; Senate Proposal, supra note 50, at 38-40.
220. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1988) ("If the preliminary determination... is affirmative,
[Commerce] ... (2) shall order the posting of a cash deposit, bond, or other security.., equal
to the estimated average amount by which the foreign market value exceeds the United States
price.. . ."). At the same time, Commerce also orders the "suspension of liquidation" on all
entries. Id. § 1673b(d) (1); see also id. § 1673d(c) (1), (4) (outlining final affirmation
determinations).
221. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a) (noting that final order is entered seven days after Commission
renders affirmative material injury determination).
222. Id. § 1673b(d) (2).
223. Id. § 1673f(a). The statute provides in relevant part:
If the amount of a cash deposit collected as security for an estimated antidumping duty
... is different from... an antidumping order.., then the difference... shall be--
(1) disregarded, to the extent the cash deposit collected is lower than the
duty under the order, or
(2) refunded, to the extent the cash deposit is higher than the duty under
the order.
Id.
224. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.23 (1994) (outlining calculations for bonds similar to 19 U.S.C. §
1873f(a) (1988)).
225. 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 394, 770 F. Supp. 648 (1991).
226. See Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 394, 395-400, 770 F. Supp.
648, 651-54 (1991) (noting that distinction made sense because cash deposit was more
burdensome to importer than posting of bond, and hence, it was "conceivable that in certain
instances Congress might have chosen to protect the provisional duty payments only for those
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The CIT's holding was based partially on the fact that the internation-
al agreements also distinguished between bonds and cash.227
The Federal Circuit reversed the CIT in Daewoo Electronics v.
International Union.228  Citing the broad deference granted to
Commerce, the court found that:
[s]ection 1673f(a) does not prohibit the application of the cap to
bonds. This provision simply does not speak to whether estimated
duty bonds cap antidumping duties. Given this silence, as well as
the statute's authorization tofie bonds to cover estimated duties, we
cannot say that [Commerce's] allowance of a duty ceiling for bonds
is contrary to the statute.2
The court in Daewoo agreed that if the statute were considered
alone, it might be read as limiting the application of a cap to cash
deposits. 230  The court, however, also considered: (1) the fact that
Commerce's regulation was promulgated contemporaneously with the
statute; (2) Commerce's consistent practice of placing ceilings on
antidumping duties irrespective of whether deposits were in the form
of a bond or cash; (3) the 1979 legislative history recognizing the
burdensomeness of cash deposits; and (4) Congress' failure to amend
the law on this issue in the prior two trade laws. 1 Moreover, the
Federal Circuit found that the CIT's analysis was flawed because it
"relied principally" on an incorrect print of GATT.23 2  Therefore,
the court held that Commerce had reasonably interpreted the statute
to permit the cap for both bonds and cash deposits.
23
The issue of capping of bonds is not addressed in the Antidumping
Agreement. The agreement's major change regarding provisional
who made those payments in the more onerous fashion"); see also Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. United
States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 583, 587, 794 F. Supp. 389, 393 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (stating that
there is no assessment rate cap if bond is deposited).
227. Zenith, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade at 397-98, 770 F. Supp. at 653.
228. 6 F.3d 1511 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In addition to the broad principals of agency deference
cited earlier in Daewoo and discussed in supra notes 172-86 and accompanying text, the court
specifically noted:
When the issue is the validity of a regulation issued under a statute that an agency is
charged with administering, it is well established that the agency's construction is
entitled to great weight. Similarly, agency regulations are to be sustained unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the statute, and are to be held valid unless
weighty reasons require otherwise.
Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. International Union, 6 F.3d 1511, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting
Melamine Chems. v. United States, 732 F.2d 924, 928 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
229. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1522.
230. Id. at 1522 n.18; cf Nissan Motor Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 884 F.2d 1375, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (reciting maxim that expreio unius est excusio alterius, meaning that expression of one
thing is exclusion of alternative).
231. Daewoo, 6 F.3d at 1522.
232. Id. at 1522-23.
233. Id. at 1523.
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measures-that provisional measures may not be applied until sixty
days after initiation234-- will not affect the Federal Circuit's decision.
In fact, the relevant language in the Antidumping Agreement parallels
the 1979 Antidumping Code language that the Federal Circuit
interpreted in Daewoo.235 Therefore, there is no reason to expect
that the court's decision in this case will be disturbed by the Uruguay
Round implementing legislation.
VIII. SCOPE
At any time after an antidumping duty order is entered, an
interested party may request a "scope ruling" from Commerce to
determine which products are included within the order.236
Commerce's scope rulings are meant to clarify whether particular
products, components, or later-developed merchandise are included
within the order.3 7
The courts have stated that when Commerce interprets the scope
of its original order-in contrast to when it determines scope for
purposes of anticircumvention-it may clarify the earlier determina-
234. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 7.3. In addition, U.S. law is expected to
codify the requirement that provisional duties normally will not be collected for more than four
months. Administration Proposal, supra note 50, at 63 (proposing to codify art. 7.4 and parallel
provision in prior Antidumping Code, art. 10.3).
235. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 50, art. 7.2. The Antidumping Agreement
provides: "Provisional measures may take the form of a provisional duty or, preferably, a security
- by cash deposit or bond - equal to the amount of the antidumping duty provisionally estimated
.°... Id.
236. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.29, 395.29 (1994) (outlining requests for rulings as to scope of
antidumping and countervailing duty orders). Commerce also rules on scope in the context of
the investigation. id. § 353.12(b) (4).
Commerce normally limits the class or kind of merchandise. Antfriction Bearings, supra note
35, at 18,999 (distinguishing different types of rollers and bearings). If Commerce finds that
there is more than one class or kind of merchandise named in the petition, then it will conduct
separate investigations for each. ANTIDtMPING MANUAL, supra note 14, Ch. 1, at 9. A single class
or kind may include not only the finished product, but also the components of that product.
See Initiation &Antidumping Duty Investigation: Certain Light Scattering Instruments and Parts
Thereof from Japan, 55 Fed. Reg. 14,333, 14,334 (1990) (including countless components of
light scattering devices in scope of investigation); see also Smith Corona Corp. v. United States,
16 Ct. Int'l Trade 562, 576-77, 796 F. Supp. 1532, 1535 (1992) (affirming Commerce's decision
not to expand scope of its antidumping duty investigation because redefining scope in
midstream would create procedural difficulties and could violate United States' international
obligations); Torrington Co. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 99, 103-04, 786 F. Supp. 1021,
1026 (1992) (affirming Commerce's exclusion of certain products from scope of investigation
because petition was ambiguous and Commerce has broad discretion in area).
237. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677j (1988) (authorizing Commerce to include within scope of existing
antidumping duty or countervailing duty order certain merchandise completed or assembled
in United States, merchandise completed or assembled in other foreign countries, merchandise
that has been subjected to minor alterations, and later-developed merchandise); 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.29(e)-(i) (outlining provisions similar to 19 U.S.C. § 1677j).
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don, but it cannot modify it." s In determining scope, Commerce
considers the prior written descriptions of the merchandise, including
the prior ITC and Commerce determinations and the petition.3 9
If these descriptions are unclear, Commerce considers the factors
identified by the CIT in Diversified Products Corp. v. United States.240
These factors, commonly known as the Diversified Products criteria,
include the physical appearance of the merchandise, 241 the ultimate
use of the merchandise,242 the expectations of the ultimate purchas-
er of the merchandise, 243 and the channels of trade in which the
merchandise moves.2
44
In Nitta Industries Corp. v. United States,245 the Federal Circuit
reviewed the CIT's affirmance of a Commerce scope ruling.246
238. See Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 730, 749-50, 802 F. Supp.
455, 460-61 (1992) (setting aside Commerce's interpretation of scope of existing antidumping
duty order on ground that Commerce had improperly expanded scope of order rather than
merely clarifying order); Alsthom Atlantique v. United States, 787 F.2d 565,571 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(reversing CIT finding that Commerce had authority to modify scope of antidumping duty
order); cf 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (granting Commerce authority to modify scope of order to prevent
circumvention).
239. SeeNitta Indus. Corp. v. United States, 997 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (discussing
process used by Commerce in determining scope of antidumping order).
240. 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 155, 162-63, 572 F. Supp. 883, 889 (1983).
241. Diversified Products Corp. v. United States, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade 155, 162-63, 572 F. Supp.
883, 889 (1983). Differences in physical characteristics are important factors in the class or kind
analysis but do not necessarily require a finding that the products belong to different classes or
kinds. See Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 854, 861, 698 F. Supp. 240,
246 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (analyzing differences between automatic and nonautomatic
typewriters); Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Certain Fresh Cut Flowers
from Ecuador, 52 Fed. Reg. 2128, 2218 (1987) (including different types of carnations in scope
of investigation); Cellular Mobile Telephones and Subassemblies from Japan; Final Determi-
nation of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 50 Fed. Reg. 45,447, 45,448 (1985) (including
subassemblies in scope of investigation because they can only be used in complete device).
242. Diversified Products, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade at 162, 572 F. Supp. at 889. Products that perform
a similar function have been found to be the same class or kind even if they do not meet the
other Diversified Products criteria. See Certain Iron Construction Castings from Canada: Final
Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value, 51 Fed. Reg. 2412, 2415 (1986) [hereinafter
Certain Iron Castings] (stating Commerce's view that heavy and light castings were not
interchangeable but both have similar use and, thus, would be one class).
243. Diverssfied Products, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade at 162, 572 F. Supp. at 889; see Live Swine from
Canada; Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,189,
22,189-90 (1988) (analyzing different expectations of purchasers of sows and boars); Erasable
Programmable Read Only Memories (EPROMs) from Japan; Final Determination of Sales at Less
than Fair Value, 51 Fed. Reg. 39,680, 39,685 (1986) [hereinafter EPROMs fromJapan] (stating
that expectations of final purchaser of different density EPROMs are final).
244. Diversified Products, 6 Ct. Int'l Trade at 162,572 F. Supp. at 889; seeEPROMs fromJapan,
supra note 243, at 39,685 (arguing that different density EPROMs are traded in same channels
and use similar advertising); Certain Iron Castings, supra note 242, at 2415 (determining that
both light and heavy castings move in same channels of trade); Portable Electric Typewriters
from Japan; Final Results of Administrative Review of Antidumping Duty Order, 48 Fed. Reg.
7768, 7770 (1983) (stating that electric and nonelectric typewriters move in same channels of
trade).
245. 997 F.2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
246. Nitta Indus. Corp. v. United States, 14 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1185 (Ct Int'l Trade 1992).
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Specifically, the issue before the court was whether the CIT had erred
in affirming Commerce's ruling that nylon core flat belts produced by
Nitta Industries Corp. and Nitta International, Inc. (collectively Nitta)
fell within the scope of Commerce's existing antidumping duty
order.2
47
First, the Federal Circuit found that Commerce had properly
determined the scope of the antidumping duty order.2' In making
its determination, Commerce had considered the description of the
subject merchandise contained in the petition, the preliminary and
final determinations of Commerce and the ITC, and the antidumping
duty order itself.249 Commerce stated that it would not consider the
broader Diversified Products factors unless it was unable to determine
the scope of the order. 0 The Federal Circuit affirmed Commerce's
decision to conduct a broader scope analysis only if the written
descriptions were not dispositive. 5 The court stated that "[s]uch
an analysis finds support in the law, and we see no error in
[Commerce's] adoption of this analysis in rendering its scope rul-
ing. 2252
Second, the Federal Circuit found that Commerce had properly
applied this approach to the facts before it.2 3 The court affirmed
Commerce's finding that the written description of the antidumping
order's scope was dispositive.' The Federal Circuit found that
Commerce's written description of the scope of its antidumping duty
order "encompassed Nitta's nylon core flat belts from the initiation
247. Nita, 997 F.2d at 1460.
248. Id. at 1463-64.
249. Id. at 1461.
250. See supra notes 240-44 and accompanying text (discussing factors in Diversfied Products).
251. Nitta, 997 F.2d at 1461.
252. Id. (citations omitted). The court cited the following prior court rulings affirming this
procedure for determining scope during the course of an investigation: Smith Corona Corp.
v. United States, 915 F.2d 683, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Alsthom Atlantique v. United States, 787
F.2d 565, 571 (Fed. Cir. 1986); SKF USA v. United States, 15 Ct. Int'l Trade 152, 762 F. Supp.
344, 349 (1991), afd, 972 F.2d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (only standing issue appealed). Nitta, 997
F.2d at 1461 The court noted that Commerce had adopted a regulation implementing this
approach after the date of Commerce's scope ruling in Nitta. Id. at 1461 n.3; see also 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.29(i) (1993).
253. Nitta, 997 F.2d at 1462.
254. Id. The court found that the petition filed by Gates Rubber Company (Gates) "clearly
encompassed Nitta's nylon core flat belts." Id. The court made this finding even though the
petition "did not reference specifically nylon core flat belts or list Nitta as a company that
[Gates] believed was selling imported products at less-than-fair-value (LTFV)," and the regulation
in effect at the time "did require some specificity in Gates' petition." Id. at 1462, 1464. The
court pointed to Gates' objection at the administrative level to Nitta's request that its belts be
excluded from the order as evidence that Gates intended Nitta's belts to be included. The court
agreed with the CIT that "'a petitioner is not required to circumscribe the entire universe of
articles which might possibly be covered by the order it seeks.'" Id. at 1464.
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of the investigation through the publication of the resulting or-
der." 5 The court noted that the Harmonized Tariff System (HTS)
numbers used throughout the investigation included Nitta's belts, and
that Commerce's written descriptions plainly included nylon core flat
belts.z 6
The Federal Circuit rejected Nitta's argument that the scope of the
antidumping duty order was rendered ambiguous by a post-order
letter submitted by the Gates Rubber Co. (Gates)," which stated
that it never intended to cover Nitta's belts, and that Commerce was
therefore required to conduct a Diversified Products analysis in its scope
ruling. 8 The court held that Gates' change of heart was irrelevant
to the scope ruling "because [Commerce] can only clarify, not modify,
the scope of an existing order." 9 Thus, if the antidumping order
is clear, as the court found it was in this case, Commerce cannot
change its scope in a subsequent scope ruling.
214
Nitta further argued that Commerce had acknowledged in its final
determination that the scope of the order was ambiguous as to
whether Nitta's belts were included.2"' Nitta relied on a statement
by Commerce that "'[t]he information received was insufficient to
determine whether the merchandise is properly excluded from the
scope of this investigation .... [U]pon receipt of proper documenta-
tion, [Commerce] may conduct a scope ruling concerning the
products imported by these firms. '"212 The Federal Circuit dis-
agreed with Nitta's contention that the quoted language meant that
Commerce had not determined whether its belts were within the
scope of the antidumping order.26 The court held that "[e]ven if
this evidence were somehow questionable, [Commerce's] scope ruling
was nevertheless proper as being supported by all of the other evi-
dence." 264
255. Id. at 1463.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1464.
258. Id.
259. Id. (citing Alsthom Atlantique v. United States, 787 F.2d 565, 571 (Fed. Cir. 1986)); see
also Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 730, 746-47, 802 F. Supp. 455, 458
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (stating that Commerce may clarify but not expand scope of antidumping
order), aff'd mem., 11 F.3d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Gold Star Co. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l
Trade 707, 709, 692 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (1988) (stating that Commerce may only clarify scope
of determination, not change or modify it).
260. Nitta, 997 F.2d at 1464.
261. Id. at 1463.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 1465.
264. Id.
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The Antidumping Agreement does not deal with the clarification
of scope issue, and the U.S. legislation is not expected to address this
issue. The Federal Circuit's holding in Nitta, therefore, is likely to
remain untouched.
IX. REVOCATION
Commerce may revoke an antidumping or countervailing duty
order if there is no interest in continuing the order 5  Such
disinterest can be found if no interested party requests an administra-
tive review for at least four years.266 Commerce's procedure is to
publish a notice in the Federal Register to notify the interested parties
of its intent to revoke.267 If no interested party objects to the
revocation within the given deadlines, Commerce revokes the
order.268
In Belton Industries v. United States,269 Commerce properly pub-
lished its intent to revoke three outstanding orders on textiles and
four outstanding orders on apparel products.2 70 Commerce did not
265. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25 (1994); id § 355.25.
266. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing other methods of revocation).
267. 19 C.F.R. § 353.25; see id. § 355.25 (providing parallel countervailing duty provision).
"If for four consecutive annual anniversary months no interested party has requested an
administrative review... of an order or suspended investigation, not later than the first day of
the fifth consecutive annual anniversary month, [Commerce] will publish in the FEDERAL
REGISMR notice of 'Intent to Revoke Order'...." 19 C.F.R. § 353.25 (d) (4). See, e.g., Notice
of Intent to Revoke Antidumping Duty Orders and Findings, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,608, at 14,608
(1994); Intent to Revoke Countervailing Duty Orders and Terminate Suspended Investigations,
59 Fed. Reg. 9727, 9727-28 (1994).
Commerce also is required to "serve written notice of the intent to revoke ... on each
interested party listed on [Commerce's] service list and on any other person which [Commerce]
has reason to believe is a producer or seller in the United States of the like product." 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.25(d) (4) (ii); id. § 355.26(d) (4) (ii) (providing parallel countervailing duty provision).
268. If an interested party objects, Commerce does not revoke the order. See, e.g.,
Determination Not To Revoke Antidumping Duty Orders, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,608, 14,608 (1994)
("Within the specified time frame, we received objections from domestic interested parties to
our intent to revoke these antidumping duty orders. Therefore, because domestic interested
parties objected to the revocation, we no longer intend to revoke these antidumping duty
orders.").
For these purposes, interested parties are limited to the relevant (1) U.S. producers, (2) trade
unions, (3) trade or business associations, a majority of whose members are producers or sellers,
and (4) an association, a majority of whose members are in one of the prior categories. See 19
U.S.C. § 1677(9) (C)-(F) (1988); 19 C.F.R. § 353.2(k) (3)-(6) (1994); seealso supra notes 19-22 and
accompanying text (discussing interested parties).
269. 6 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denid, 62 U.S.L.W. 3491 (U.S.Jan. 25, 1994).
270. Belton Indus. v. United States, 6 F.3d 756, 758-59 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 62
U.S.L.W. 3491 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1994). These orders were for textiles from Argentina, Peru, and
Sri Lanka and on apparel from Argentina, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Id. at 759.
Commerce also published its intent to terminate suspended investigations on textiles from
Thailand and Columbia and on apparel products from Columbia. Id. While all of these cases
involved countervailing duty orders, the procedures and issues would be the same for
antidumping duty orders.
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provide written notice to the interested parties for any of these orders
nor to the interested parties' counsel for five of the orders.271
Counsel for the interested parties in the textile cases, however, filed
timely objections to all of the intended revocations on behalf of the
American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. (ATMI) and its
member companies. 72  After the filing deadline, ATMI's counsel
clarified that its objections were on behalf of the individual ATMI
member companies that Commerce had previously recognized as
interested parties.2 73  Nevertheless, Commerce revoked the orders
on the ground that the only timely objection was from ATMI, which,
as an association, was not an interested party and therefore did not
have standing to object. 274
The Federal Circuit overturned Commerce's revocation of the
textile orders.275  First, the court held that Commerce's failure to
notify the parties was harmless error because counsel had received
actual notice. 6 Second, the court further held that Commerce had
received "reasonable notice" from the interested parties for the textile
orders.2 77  The court summarized the notice requirements as
follows:
The statute does not impose on interested parties an exacting
standard for filing objections. Neither does the regulation require
271. Id. Commerce did not send separately written notice to the interested parties in any
of the proceedings. Id. It sent written notice to American Textile Manufacturers Institute
(ATMI) of the revocations of orders on products from Argentina and Peru and to ATMI's
counsel of the proposed revocations of orders on products from Peru and Sri Lanka.
Commerce, however, failed to send written notice of its intent to terminate the remaining orders
regarding products from Columbia and Thailand. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 758-60 for a detailed summary of the administrative proceedings. Commerce
rejected counsel's explanation that Commerce should have known who the ATMI member
companies were because the same issues had arisen in the underlying proceeding. Id. at 761.
Commerce therefore revoked the orders against textile and apparel products from Argentina,
Peru, and Sri Lanka, terminated the suspended investigations of textile and apparel products
from Columbia, and terminated in part the investigation of textiles from Thailand. Id. at 760.
275. Id. at 762-63. In the CIT appeal, the CIT held that Commerce had unlawfully revoked
all of the orders and terminated the investigations. Id. at 760. It found that Commerce had
violated its regulations requiring written notice to interested parties of revocation or
termination. Id. at 761. In the alternative, the CIT found that the interested parties had
submitted timely objections to the revocation and termination. Id.
276. Id. The court stated that "notice to the counsel is notice to the client unless the
applicable notice provision expressly requires otherwise." Id. (citing Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 92-93 (1990)).
Apparently, the unions that had filed the original apparel cases were not represented by the
same counsel, and the court commented that Commerce's failure to provide notice either to
the parties or the appropriate counsel "call[ed] into question" Commerce's revocation and
terminations of these cases. Id. at 762 n.4. Because the unions did not appeal Commerce's
action, however, the issue was not before the court. Id.
277. Id. at 761.
TRADE DECISIONS AND THE URUGUAY ROUND
exactitude from objecting parties. Rather, it requires reasonable
notice to Commerce of objection to a proposed termination.171
Thus, the Federal Circuit rejected Commerce's application of such
technical filing requirements and reversed Commerce's revocation for
the textile orders.2 79 The Federal Circuit, however, upheld revoca-
tion of the orders on apparel products because ATMI's member
companies were not interested parties for these products, and no
interested party had objected to these revocations.28 °
While the Uruguay Round provision on revocation will significantly
alter Commerce's revocation of antidumping and countervailing duty
orders,281 it does not deal with the issue of notice, and therefore, is
not expected to affect the court's holding in Belton.
The Antidumping Agreement modifies the definition of interested
party to include "a trade or business association a majority of the
members of which are producers, exporters or importers" of the
subject merchandise, and the U.S. legislation is expected to parallel
this change." 2 Therefore, the factual issue raised in Belton of
whether the proper party had provided notice will not arise in the
future. The court's finding regarding what constitutes adequate
notice, however, was not addressed in the Antidumping Agreement
and is not expected to be affected by the legislation. 8
278. Id.
279. Id. at 762-63.
280. Id. at 758. The Federal Circuit also denied Sri Lanka and Peru's motions to intervene
as untimely. Id. at 762. The court found that the prejudice of having to address new issues and
parties outweighed any harm to Sri Lanka and Peru caused by their own tactical decision not
to appear in the prior two years. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the court balanced the factors
presented in Sumitomo Metal Indus. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 669 F.2d 703 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
Beton, 6 F.3d at 762.
281. Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 11.3. The Uruguay Round Agreement
provides that antidumping and countervailing duty orders will be automatically revoked in five
years unless they are reviewed and it is determined that the "expiry would be likely to lead to
continuance or recurrence of dumping or injury." Id. This provision, often called the "Sunset"
provision, will be one of the most significant changes in U.S. antidumping and countervailing
duty law.
282. AntidumpingAgreement, supra note 49, art. 6.11; see alsoAdministration Proposal, supra
note 50, at 59.
283. The Antidumping Agreement provision on revocation and the expected modification
to U.S. law, however, will contain some of the most significant changes to U.S. law. The
"Sunset" provision requires that an order be terminated within five years unless there is a
determination that revoking the order "would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence
of dumping and injury." Antidumping Agreement, supra note 49, art. 11.3; see also Administra-
tion Proposal, supra note 50, at 78 (regarding implementation of Sunset provision); House
Proposal, supra note 50, at 18-19 (same); Senate Proposal, supra note 50, at 59-63 (same).
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CONCLUSION
The 1993 trade decisions of the Federal Circuit will be overshad-
owed by the Uruguay Round Agreement. The U.S. amendments
implementing that agreement-in conjunction with the restricted
subject matter of the court's published decisions-will limit the
precedential value of the court's decisions. Practitioners and students
therefore should tread cautiously in relying on these decisions. While
some of the court's decisions are likely to be unaffected, e.g., the
scope of the holding in Daewoo, other decisions are likely to be over-
turned, e.g., the decision on standing in Minebea. As a result, the 1993
Federal Circuit decisions are probably more significant for the court's
overall approach to judicial review of Commerce decisions than as a
guide to the future development of the antidumping laws.
